Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4e8600ce2a751dc7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

227.2 KB
MD5: 479dc808b7ac309fed2863416ecc0e9d SHA-1: f1a2545fe26a48cd2c71c74df299722a1fb1fe27 SHA-256: 4e8600ce2a751dc7694ba0379c8412c17a94556783990e3cbe0e856993d23bfa
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with one specifically configured for automatic linking and updating. This technique is commonly used to trick users into activating embedded content, which can then execute malicious code. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document likely contains instructions to enable macros or editing, further supporting its use as a delivery mechanism for a malicious payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
396623746c8c883fbed219056635abe38104c288d37522d71e443456dcb02f45
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19605 bytes
objdata_01_off0000a950.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA950 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000bef3.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBEF3 12297 bytes