Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4e49fef4fcdb630d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.1 KB Created: 2021-06-21 13:51:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 6b3da48a9153a315488fb8c149eb4302 SHA-1: f5118853edc990f1ff24e5f70951d0ee1d19fbf9 SHA-256: 4e49fef4fcdb630d59135489bdc70ec413cec8ce72510699baf21f34565df631
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of links pointing to compromised WordPress sites, indicating a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or phish users. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious verdict, and the presence of multiple compromised CMS upload links further reinforces this assessment. No scripts were extracted, limiting the analysis to the document's structure and embedded URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://chcial.ru/uplcv?utm_term=step+wizard+bootstrap+4
    • http://www.dadosefatos.net.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b5546d4ea20---mutubetejazibenazosuxo.pdf
    • http://www.melloecastro.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c6655945ec---rifubifefofona.pdf
    • https://spaslask.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/is7g2mgej7tfdcl2vdnlpp218o/benalukededo.pdf
    • http://www.investing-in-women.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160abfeaf91f40---20197385727.pdf
    • https://dixietemporarystorage.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9ac4a5554ba6a4fade120338a8074050/tukapalazuv.pdf
    • http://www.maarsehoveniers.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160945e2766b87---82551859276.pdf
    • https://vannordenvastgoed.nl/userfiles/file/92328343156.pdf
    • https://storage-in-motion.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c4d2fc66ba---78366256287.pdf
    • http://divorce-difficile.fr/userfiles/file/jumawofox.pdf
    • https://regeneracion-capilar.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5212d1219e8ef7e7d92367ab3afa930f/78517497179.pdf
    • https://ready4use.ru/uploads/files/weridewekesa.pdf
    • https://chicagoportablexray.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ab9169e1222---39577617041.pdf
    • http://kingspec.su/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/plu92rj6ic7bp3amika0ujr3oe/91789088940.pdf
    • http://yuseigachi.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c38800bea4d---wugavoduno.pdf
    • https://stellabakingcompany.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b592e8bcc18---68468395312.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cf8a.bin
b1019e74ef3a0d4919e723be0b52aac3836c98d61f40ac58472564b22ed3e8b9
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCF8A 5392 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e20b.bin
10ca9a66be37f68843167e1fe5f3a0c5300c4d68d76ac252071614a3e3e5cd57
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE20B 11068 bytes