RTF malware analysis — malicious · 4e3c4ea383e6ed5c

MALICIOUS

RTF

66.2 KB First seen: 2024-12-13

MD5: b67bbb2a9fdfc3e89e2ed4c32ef9eb54 SHA-1: 48b9d48847ad58a55f1a8dfc5872962358dedc6e SHA-256: 4e3c4ea383e6ed5c00672e08adabe24fc142cd05c86830a79c15c90412a2f588

200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with a critical heuristic indicating the Equation Editor (Equation.3) is targeted for exploitation via CVE-2017-11882. The ".bin" file extracted from the OLE object likely contains the malicious payload. The embedded script, though truncated, suggests attempts to decode and execute arbitrary code, typical of a dropper or initial access mechanism.

Heuristics 6

Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED

RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000020.bin` `e4f7974de11d1a4fcd725d25a385fa84148d1d824f0e32c46ce15b986dc0c694`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x20	28999 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s).
`objdata_01_off0000fb48.bin` `6ef048de06e9c2e6b420e78a489e52123766b08549a074a5f95b98ffe8558f38`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xFB48	1709 bytes
`objdata_02_off0000fb58.bin` `8935eb605040753f89379b3f05c2cdaefba833ec64299ed9c258020f4c1217b0`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xFB58	36 bytes

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