Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4e2b20cf2415b3f6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

229.0 KB
MD5: 71c8a2cb434b1dbe558c404795c4d18f SHA-1: c5e61fa4e3a88afe0d2fd9634eb682ea7c701506 SHA-256: 4e2b20cf2415b3f6c6dc1edfeb7448ec4d1ff9ac32ef041913fcea71902f7f3d
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an encrypted Office document, identified as an exploit carrier due to the presence of an Equation Editor OLE object. The critical heuristic indicates an encrypted and malformed package, likely containing malicious code. The specific heuristic 'CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY' points to an exploit targeting CVE-2018-0798 within the Equation Editor. This suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability upon opening, leading to the execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • Encrypted Office package with CFB FAT corruption critical OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED
    Encrypted-package shape co-occurs with FAT-chain corruption — the documented combined evasion form.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.