Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4e1018ce3c42d6ad…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.6 KB Created: 2021-02-10 23:33:39 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-04-10
MD5: 1c980f17cc3f3b87e9a1cd866d05b9a9 SHA-1: a5bba32128e3672d8a0f0f9a99a0d25456c86632 SHA-256: 4e1018ce3c42d6ad3f351a604c63fc4e37e95f92bc3a43075b3449d24ec5a18c
236 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Remote-support tool lure high SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE
    Document instructs the user to install, open, or connect with a remote-support tool such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or ScreenConnect — high-risk in an unsolicited document
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://baarspo.ru/123?utm_term=log+kill+hypothesis PDF link annotation
    • https://rupebadik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134465272/d6a9b844513.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dofexoxev/gBehihf/zififolumesorotalanusinin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zowonefaso/ewaxibf/fokufivakusidibizet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/temisexezoda/cFJihie/pulasavisarozefo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kewukapugino/hgcrtgh/dowazezedaja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kepebeso/irMyjdL/traffic_run_play_for_free_online.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/busoleva/jbifiiA/teamviewer_quicksupport_download_for_windows_10.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tokuniti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134331772/wapaxuxegol-fefimapege-tifeni-xobawoxopeku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fuvebopeweb/eGpzSvm/41506655929.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fitokuzigijot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134681543/pusaxasov-sujanesa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vefutifeves/jhgiQjb/ugandan_knuckles_vrchat_world.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pujixefan/QhiiaY1/23921714668.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4420604/normal_5fcb109c95189.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fiwujumejuf/hgVKLhj/raid_shadow_legends_cheat_codes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/najipavez/97117641908.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e10f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE10F 4880 bytes
SHA-256: db52a9935a04286787329d2ea50ed6dcb8f567d3d0649a05ce6bbe1ff6cf6a25
font_01_sfnt_off0000f1c3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF1C3 10596 bytes
SHA-256: e62718b0fbb0ebdd2ec4497f0fcbe273d58e5123ecf881a906f62531272d7579