Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4defed9be0fcbb8f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.23 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 2a349d1c3ffb9ea96501a2fed094ea9c SHA-1: 3416dcfe13e4b9da5949a9fcc8d3936b0a053c2c SHA-256: 4defed9be0fcbb8f64ce97714322ddd4ac6b8ab27ebc2208086fe5ba5264cb35
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that is activated via \objupdate, triggering CVE-2017-8759. This exploit targets MSXML SAX for activation, indicating a likely attempt to execute arbitrary code. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJDATA heuristics further supports the exploitation of embedded objects within the RTF structure. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear user-facing content, but the technical indicators point to a malicious exploit delivery.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00130744.bin
862b605251990fd41367c3e4f66bd01a7580f71def72de8c0320450e7a87b9d1		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x130744 3732 bytes

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