Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4de54f1ee6c8dfb6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

229.1 KB
MD5: 4caed5978f0e3c3057daac0d8ad64b4c SHA-1: dd6a17c5c8e0ee8a887818f01602a3d10aa132c6 SHA-256: 4de54f1ee6c8dfb697ce517e38f1d0ced60bd6dd04cb252ee0618c3160c448aa
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. This suggests the document is designed to exploit OLE object vulnerabilities or trick the user into activating embedded content, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further supports this, indicating the document attempts to prompt the user to enable macros or editing.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
4a0dca26052c058793f8600b25471da8f33538a277477a5282b925223cd8175b		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 20567 bytes
objdata_01_off0000b120.bin
1af484323aa51f0bc067b498458ed2106db428c7b743185ac9a6e18e7b648e31		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB120 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c6c3.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC6C3 12297 bytes

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