Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4dce4ae9e3703f91…

MALICIOUS

RTF

142.4 KB First seen: 2025-02-26
MD5: fe1d1d081fdd49de785049f4c94944b5 SHA-1: 2d56eb3bd0130e905459a9784a6a88ad5af1f178 SHA-256: 4dce4ae9e3703f910cb1d12d9f03d0e135022229156a0bedb3a52455c8c6b495
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document containing a malicious OLE object, specifically identified as a payload for CVE-2017-11882. The presence of `RTF_OBJDATA`, `RTF_OBJAUTLINK`, `CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE`, and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this known vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to execute arbitrary code or download additional malware.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001330.bin
f8705c66e33c055dcc4a9154dd4abe45238e936157647c8ae840b520798f6f2b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1330 4153 bytes