Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4d75878a57bc2dea…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

80.3 KB Created: 2021-04-01 07:27:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: df222ec505953bd0d09fbe53f3d275cd SHA-1: 62999c2f6e755f98eb9cf471cbd788451e32a024 SHA-256: 4d75878a57bc2deaae723ccb8ca2a41f13b85649c12dfb7e57a3133181785d37
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains a VBA project with an AutoOpen macro, indicating it is designed to run malicious code upon opening. Critical heuristics indicate the use of Shell() and WScript.Shell, suggesting the macro attempts to execute commands or scripts. This likely serves to download and execute a secondary payload, a common technique for initial access.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
696887b91f0828b494dbeeb2dfc418a142fcf431353a610a1f400febbac6365b
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 9488 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
8ab3a6e4aea2ab1bec0f892ba733cbcf55b135febf8be9bb4f6e47d8d38f5aa6
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 40960 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.