Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4d6c5607f1e859fe…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.3 KB Created: 2021-08-26 01:16:47 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: b740e80bd6ba62c8233fa95689207ac5 SHA-1: f866839c895227527beeb141c74076f40eff5656 SHA-256: 4d6c5607f1e859fe91c91f0df464ebc1cc92be331d7b9c3cb3c7a322471b4502
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to compromised websites or disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware delivery. The presence of external URI heuristics and link farm indicators further supports this assessment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9987

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://queure.ru/uplcv?utm_term=least+common+denominator+of+8+and+9 PDF link annotation
    • http://manpukuorder.com/uploads/files/vesunaruzogojazexopulo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://edu-mate.kr/_UploadFile/Images/file/nozufoduzuxiteveni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nepalimodelagency.com/userfiles/file/kagosipaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://techscreening.com/userfiles/files/kezovidamin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tragiaocolamsapa.com/userfiles/image/file/78520768356.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://getem.pl/files/file/jifekowobusijidisigile.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mabuksusu.com/contents//files/vetusa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.drserapkagan.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/n7e2m1t9bpis9brtkkekocl636/58915399727.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.alex-vasilkov.ru/images/wisdom/file/julireni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thedewakohchang.com/image/upload/File/exukixiruduxeruro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://planet-for-events.de/userfiles/file/rikawuduzujezeba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sistarelaw.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/sepidegudoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://daegyung.kr/userfiles/file/20210721005125.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sg-callenberg.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609565862aa93---78206727396.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.olympusnorge.no/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f4e6rdqmo9njtgg848gd6dmb10/32609920850.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.simcoerecovery.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bkbdisptpalp2vsp313nhgmrqr/98057791101.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kamennykoberec.eu/editor_uploads/system/files/kotirejugidubojoxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.coconutlodge.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160be775cd8132---5780191771.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.fullmooneye.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607f673bcc880---jixatonejesedebuvibegus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://makinsushi.com/uploads/files/31703888919.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jandenzobv.com/image_uploads/file/68218407144.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://goactive.hu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0edd0a95e27e095621a1a6620d9a9eac/42484824866.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hz-karavany.cz/ckfinder/userfiles/files/63027994006.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c53d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC53D 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000dd54.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD54 10924 bytes
SHA-256: 9e6f67472b0c09541d110a1728b8ed7a8d5f3f6c0cf0cecbfb12a8c7afbebf45
font_02_sfnt_off0000f6a1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF6A1 15196 bytes
SHA-256: e445154e8cbc836dfc466cb85012c25e9570c4fd20e76ad53ca9102bf501d036

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