Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4d6927ae4b4f0661…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

107.0 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: c07cd95b5c02fb3237d3e8d9b0374a4e SHA-1: a3c0e0ca1296065e6736a51fa4d224465b14fd1b SHA-256: 4d6927ae4b4f06617bfa5ebecfe90a5d6b13181b6db745029fb94f3f63679c23
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The OLE document exhibits anomalies in its slack space and contains an appended executable payload, indicating it's a container for malicious code. Although VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of appended payload bytes strongly suggests the file's intent is to download and execute a second-stage payload. The SHA256 hash is included as a primary indicator.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 109,592 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 85,027 bytes (78%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.

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