Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4d2fdcbf3b8b90d8…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

30.4 KB First seen: 2023-01-17
MD5: 0754228e8c4651372973196484bc2fda SHA-1: cc4af3d79b48d9e77ebb62dbb5a66dd788cf11f9 SHA-256: 4d2fdcbf3b8b90d8d7e24375bbdeb043ed55c4838195063e561ead7e1cfe4606
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate and a lure to 'Enable editing' strongly suggests this is a malicious document designed to trigger an exploit upon user interaction. No specific family could be identified from the available evidence.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005c4d.bin
6639394a8ca4e64796986fb4babc917e8d7c8b64137c304a09ef7070b9725735
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5C4D 1853 bytes