Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4ccb033b00d08534…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.9 KB Created: 2021-09-16 09:20:25 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: a69608b41b9b9fd387c6ee8a7ce530b8 SHA-1: 0c7daea98bc6052a7a71ba17d011b775ca68f317 SHA-256: 4ccb033b00d085341fcf060c420e8da84d0c3d5abae57bde87e031184d4cb86f
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs that function as a link farm, directing users to external sites, some of which are compromised CMS uploads. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware delivery. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and URL patterns are consistent with malicious document lures.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9975

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://charmingcurls.se/upload/file/24926870334.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://cleannshieldflorida.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0759fadf5ad8de0c12dab2e4fb89ce8b/59222245225.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hanleyresources.com/images/63737073492.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://www.zolmedis.lt/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sevojofamavazoraro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zakuskymoser.cz/www/ckfinder/userfiles/files/30828248834.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://atlantichomeportugal.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613cca5d45c67---zaburorotejelavalulu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nkmate.com/FileData/ckfinder/files/20210907_D65B27AAB4660084.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ontis.sk/editor_uploads/system/files/84051638513.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://guchen.ru/d/files/61348863802.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kiapelhrimov.cz/UserFiles/File/84698012932.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://radtel-sport.pl/userfiles/file/65488581549.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vallejardin.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c769647e589eba75c5102a59077afffc/76665654014.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nova-auto.com/upload/34034971914.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.aamuhsv-madisonalumni.org/files/files/jaxavaxedosak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://formapolis.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3b514ff3ae9e4edc101b952e8c994a41/pefifovatumezeviziso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dipinkrishna.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161428d69a72bc---45733373908.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.tonygssoulfood.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f3b2fc463f00be85dd54779bd18b94c6/22007313485.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://b2b-intelligence.it/uploads/file/62216354044.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.instalacionescueto.com/nueva/ckfinder/userfiles/files/96399793221.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://140.121.180.103/ckfinder/userfiles/files/wuvixuri.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://royalgroup.at/tmp/38177533987.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sjar-tech.com/uploadfile/file///2021090315130191.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://morabia.fi/images/file/lubezozizadolidoxafezu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bangiyaparishadtoronto.ca/bpt/editor/uploadfiles/27327623953.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://giftboxvietthuy.com/upload/ck/files/metegowote.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cleannshieldflorIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/A3Ryygt5BCM/uplcv?utm_term=crazycall+net+for+androidPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d41b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD41B 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000ec2d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEC2D 18880 bytes
SHA-256: 51b838fdd01ff8fe2385443d5c7e18dd6e43e788e309105ef64b283fee288579
font_02_sfnt_off00011d90.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11D90 10508 bytes
SHA-256: f6dad97e67adf5f9c54b516fafe48553b0c995934366e05d898b599f7cdf83b2

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