Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4c9f9d1f461440db…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.0 KB Created: 2020-04-09 11:30:55 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: 80bfb75a964b7b5986a2720cfdcc00af SHA-1: 3669711d33205ae52a2c999a06f1b6f3a66a2ecd SHA-256: 4c9f9d1f461440db788b2e66d57d9508856cb845ab3e64cba8d47b789704a8b0
62 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains a large number of external links to other PDF files hosted on various domains. This pattern is indicative of a link farm or a method to distribute content across many sites. The primary URL http://ordinaryheir.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738951/130738951.html#que+significa+estudio+de+gabinete suggests a lure related to 'cabinet study'. No scripts were extracted, and the document body is heavily obfuscated, limiting further analysis of the immediate payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ordinaryheir.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738951/130738951.html#que+significa+estudio+de+gabinete
    • http://let-there-be-history.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739715/9096074.pdf
    • http://pedagogiecsdceo.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621244/2704245.pdf
    • http://ameleyounsi.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453336/5951041.pdf
    • http://patternsofwholeness.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408131/eb8ddaaa82afa2d.pdf
    • http://alphamanifesto.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398324/gopovonuzonotitef.pdf
    • http://ppaccttaxservices.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130551567/kelugiwotep.pdf
    • http://bizplan101.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130551604/gezekojazanaxa.pdf
    • http://heartsonfirefoundation.org/uploads/1/3/0/2/130273626/1455607.pdf
    • http://bee-chem.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130540788/mevaxevux_jaletatu_woxisejope_kavavaxe.pdf
    • http://naderafzalan.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130289304/8655757.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007df9.bin
f9376df15ad4189ea4b703c36b7e79acc06fc1166e107bc385da217267bebfc1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7DF9 2276 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000087f1.bin
b242a19837823c1d5e96bfdd329d13b88cd42cef8a6682daab19bc190390c469
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x87F1 9448 bytes