Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4c6f46739ec75bd3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

63.8 KB Created: 2020-11-17 14:50:59 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 8dfbbde102ede41db3763a3f3c53a62c SHA-1: d5a5440b49b6843fca5305eab56035722ddf9940 SHA-256: 4c6f46739ec75bd3a10a1dc828933b1a9e98e30095b711bad560b783bbb8d5ca
266 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It contains a link farm with multiple external URLs, including one pointing to a potential credential harvesting page. The heuristics also indicate it's a lure for MFA or password-protected archive handoffs, suggesting a phishing or credential theft attempt. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself likely facilitates the attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffe.ru/123?utm_term=yahoo+recovery+email+changed
    • https://zapilututok.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134341349/kumabonefumutid.pdf
    • https://jotitotibewava.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383271/d75d3cc.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4371509/normal_5f89abb558ad6.pdf
    • https://fudegenajeno.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134581691/d89f1.pdf
    • https://fusefediwotedi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134589876/4650355.pdf
    • https://guzuzixud.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134357052/koxowepexene.pdf
    • https://basuxebuj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379820/bofitopuruz.pdf
    • https://bizumoku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681494/5587299.pdf
    • https://luwobidope.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814225/fodekabokogano_jotaziwebelo_bimonimodal.pdf
    • https://kikeletiwemuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134671512/7afd0a9c05.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3ca327ce-0ff2-4097-83c0-245b8fa258c5/10238670623.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5f7108ad-6c50-48c8-a173-6adbc3750d8a/somezojimunij.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000bf2f.bin
3b73a24cce17a7497d7502dac28ce6121d0e3386164669cef32fd5c31f1cc482		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBF2F 5300 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d118.bin
b28e78a960131253e49671487f28514521b81760e8b745b5776cd224cc91ee52		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD118 9908 bytes

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