Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4c61585c2708fa41…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

16.2 KB Created: 2022-04-04 11:53:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 7f7fd74a158865e3530a0906ca0f4d6f SHA-1: 731be033e770ae18b6ee5b9d39ca1773afa00cc9 SHA-256: 4c61585c2708fa41fad7990baf2c31d98eea2d1b31d1a0459285843a108dd55a
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The sample is a DOCX file that exploits the CVE-2022-30190 vulnerability, also known as Follina. It achieves this by embedding an external OLE object that points to the URL http://212.138.130.8/analysis.html. This URL is likely used to download and execute a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection further confirms the malicious nature of this exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2022-30190 — Follina stage-1 external HTML oleObject critical CVE likely CVE_2022_30190
    External OLEObject relationship targets a remote .html with the Follina delivery shape (oleObject -> HTTP(S) HTML with trailing Moniker '!'). In live Follina samples the ms-msdt: trigger is served by the remote HTML, not the document itself.
  • ClamAV: Win.Exploit.CVE_2022_30190-9951234-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Exploit.CVE_2022_30190-9951234-1
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
363aea73362986651bfe9cc3d8c7338a70c847d7128dbde418fcf46b56db3257		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 3584 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
d29c432308ec471718f2b526af4c02af520b276ffcf801983015ac5dc23896b4		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 452 bytes

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