Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4c52f2b312e5be2d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB
MD5: 52cac8a55eba0dec84564f5a7942a45c SHA-1: 03b4738ec48332b74b5fd0d4f46f7db005189b4a SHA-256: 4c52f2b312e5be2d215c9e2b7d16b15af31dc1984e299e9e58c3cc46cc6b5e78
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening, leading to exploitation. This pattern is commonly used to deliver a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000cf.bin
4f498324263b5ca914b9a1c14006d244176aede850c6b21117a9edd0b45e4dc0
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCF 1549 bytes