Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4c5052dec4611963…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.6 KB Created: 2020-08-10 12:49:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 6014ca175cc4898566e8101086958793 SHA-1: d915a7b49685c3c7354a340273eda19cc26394af SHA-256: 4c5052dec4611963e8d0a3011eee699440261de6940d6bbd7c9d3a958c560f13
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains numerous embedded links, with a critical heuristic identifying a link to a known malicious redirector at 'https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=korean+cinderella+story+pdf'. This suggests the document's primary purpose is to redirect users to malicious infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, also contains this URL, reinforcing the malicious intent. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure and embedded links are sufficient to infer the attack pattern.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=korean+cinderella+story+pdf
    • http://files.thebearsdencafe.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437669/dutunituluneku.pdf
    • http://namaxukag.campaignchurchofchrist.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380600/8b79869.pdf
    • http://files.3secondsinthestripes.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776104/3850e70.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/7259/4844/files/45174450613.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1003/9719/files/derezadawup.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/1324/9944/files/projeto_piscicultura_tanque_rede.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/83300066175.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6585/1542/files/53880413544.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/8039/3639/files/46424550507.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1787/1265/files/54562534400.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3262/4808/files/17994440142.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8802/7543/files/east_vs_west_key_and_peele_names.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9857/0909/files/gimilezedib.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000633c.bin
ae6b036ad3ec164d47967be13bc4ce436a1e573459b0c4ed7c030d46119b5667		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x633C 5220 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000751b.bin
bd4ff3af131f71bb707ecbbe75fdd1a640f174ac13f5b532630748915fe3ebaf		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x751B 9540 bytes

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