Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4c49e6affab07d45…

MALICIOUS

RTF

7.2 KB First seen: 2019-05-10
MD5: fc369608826c19268a4b7b4b3084ddfe SHA-1: f4ca2d55fe1264f9fed6433fd8ab428f27ed24bb SHA-256: 4c49e6affab07d45da3c06d4473ad18fbdc0883c0b425481b802e8fe0708e3ee
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that exploits the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the object is activated, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection name further confirms the exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000036.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x36 3641 bytes
SHA-256: 0c7df6cb2550f1074ef6f2249bab64abca41f3bad9f4b13e4ef13403e7b6fe02