Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4c40d3ae8a5a2f70…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.2 KB Created: 2021-03-18 13:44:58 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 5f42b0143cbe6e67bdcb45b61ff5f6d6 SHA-1: 8666b700446acb81a1458e1f74ca3a190295c160 SHA-256: 4c40d3ae8a5a2f705d37bcd5033ea4c9eae783a2181397c4d7d624ef6777498b
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URLs point towards a malicious document designed to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://midufefew.ru/aws?utm_term=how+much+does+corian+cost+in+australia
    • https://renalulawe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134735886/c2bb4e8d494568f.pdf
    • https://botitanape.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969352/f4fdfa54d7.pdf
    • https://ravuwiva.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134519437/xajixukuwowej.pdf
    • https://totobulamu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310137/juvipoj_ganololedimovo_vazimatawit_sotefudada.pdf
    • https://putukaxuke.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437363/2781738.pdf
    • https://jufufowepum.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135348100/zubiseluduwu-xosakaguve.pdf
    • https://xekijepomi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134508866/6362b8ead3a.pdf
    • https://tegidaweriwasul.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483440/40275a2ae8dcf7.pdf
    • http://vuwulaviwu.iblogger.org/zirusexo.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://95049c82-e412-4913-a0b0-e03e83d5170a.filesusr.com/ugd/127d6e_83f6228b527a4c6194f5af9bf947604a.pdf?index=true
    • http://kegipufi.rf.gd/excel_spreadsheet_download_free.pdf
    • http://tajemom.epizy.com/pelasazolosojirusorati.pdf
    • http://fogosapew.epizy.com/10796406202.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wamatasamegu/60216357623.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wekibik/bilemeluwevuvetapizun.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/runuzitexokol/battery_report_macbook.pdf
    • http://pibunowawoxi.epizy.com/jquery_ajax_call_form_data.pdf
    • http://ganesuk.epizy.com/idioms_worksheets_for_4th_graders.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dazemi/13725672638.pdf
    • https://caf0f927-206f-4b4e-aa34-0dd3da53679b.filesusr.com/ugd/83d902_1955465d68cf4cc9955e45ef4de049c7.pdf?index=true
    • http://voronuxo.epizy.com/how_did_cs_lewis_explain_science_as_religion.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/towutoginadivu/10375364172.pdf
    • http://lememisuxelivem.rf.gd/rotuvabaj.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fd1a.bin
17a776897611768636ddf3909416891da818a422b058fd33b405ac0bb7632779		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFD1A 5116 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010e5d.bin
8ec470c8d4909fbdfaa9fa2d6698a5e1155cc90ca928cfc7846ec1425338bed5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10E5D 10852 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001333c.bin
ce7e2e230a41ba6fc2d7d2240890c8289d67876d84a3d076d67c0b48111c8230		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1333C 4324 bytes

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