Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4c27efe2e7408fbc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.8 KB
MD5: 340cba9a80279a2ff1b2a8a0d1d2ef2c SHA-1: 5cd984b429314e7600c9c4b6e35bd7eb718d76e8 SHA-256: 4c27efe2e7408fbcd0b09e9a8e39c7f05146caa990c82c09b8dc156e4aa9b5be
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204 User Execution

The sample is a PDF document that exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code, indicating a malicious intent to compromise the user's system. The PDF contains embedded XFA forms and scripts, which are commonly used to deliver exploits.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
a89f84fbbeb405245d51913e4263e3603c3c61d76cc30c5cfe0af150b4402f77
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101402 bytes