Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4c26e6e6d7e2ea1c…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.22 MB Authoring application: Riched20 6.3.9600 First seen: 2018-10-09
MD5: 14352a2c04100b45b01cade959037319 SHA-1: 8a0e90acc2238e24237db8de006e130bf646f650 SHA-256: 4c26e6e6d7e2ea1c313e754ac69c847411d23760e235a118f408b33f4e96bbac
500 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the embedded object is activated. The presence of PE headers within the hex-encoded data further suggests a malicious payload is hidden within the object. The file is classified as malicious due to this exploit.

Heuristics 12

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6584355-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6584355-1
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Package object class high RTF_OBJCLASS_PACKAGE
    OLE Package object — can wrap arbitrary files
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1266KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ef.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xEF 633072 bytes
SHA-256: 051820efcc2d7e45813d5105940afa2c0376836b9d092387aa65521f2aacad34
objdata_01_off0013531e.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x13531E 3980 bytes
SHA-256: 48e76013cfeda5e9a94f082e775a5cb6b54c98d7529d5d28c472b7f6eef3d4e3
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd.exe /c%tmp%\Windows.exe &��D$,f-Q���%
objdata_02_off00137564.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x137564 3546 bytes
SHA-256: 255e86b121e583046ff506f12b61d2353ac7432188993e8631fee626ca764ed5
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd.exe /c%tmp%\Windows.exe A C