Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4ba3bf6168a22e8d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

139.7 KB Created: 2005-07-28 14:30:16 -01:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 6.0 for Word (via Acrobat Distiller 6.0.1 (Windows))
MD5: 44e4b97f462d376df45a1d0a24a3cd62 SHA-1: 6a2352b92c5daa74f768604e06673a8bb367e89d SHA-256: 4ba3bf6168a22e8d6f868fcf99fcdb86bf1f3e61581275dedb469d0e54316bb7
432 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains a critical launch action that executes cmd.exe with parameters designed to run a dropped payload. This payload is an embedded Windows executable masquerading as 'authororderform.pdf'. The combination of a launch action, embedded PE payload, and JavaScript dropper strongly indicates a malicious intent to execute arbitrary code. The ClamAV detection 'Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586' further confirms its malicious nature.

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\authororderform.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
authororderform.pdf
7906e3aba46a493f9007972f5b61c44b55a2af0bf412bdaa9b13d4c2631c2043		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 591 at offset 0x1DA3C 37888 bytes
javascript_obj0592_000.js
a2b754b2acabf4d5345aa0510eaf1ddf62293812f4194e227704c5f472bb9929		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 592 at offset 0x227CB 64 bytes
icc_00_off00005718.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x5718 3144 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000a643.bin
d1d30fcae1801e112772b18c0778fa531bb86ecd22403774e8308bc846d70ea9		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA643 17984 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d936.bin
41ba0e7e0702e8d4abe07d83592797f0230f40ad7b98ef337774fd7ef00f15a2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD936 12004 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000f34e.bin
cd2bc8a7ee118b0590db2053c7da3630f71da230f06c2a2fc23e64000afdb53d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF34E 14516 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off00011360.bin
487d6c82d322e917b610bc8613c8b02dadd8b5c3d449ccdeccd48dde52143e94		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11360 14064 bytes
font_04_sfnt_off0001320c.bin
54c681bf40857c472c955086f53dd016b2381dc4df07f8fc4c4a3454422a3440		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1320C 7616 bytes
font_05_sfnt_off00014193.bin
983b077b22b3ee2b86ebdd0890997380b8b681960ee48ae415335cb8bc9a8cbd		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14193 5408 bytes
font_06_sfnt_off00014d87.bin
600507cbb3289954a6bc84a29c73d81069aae9b5bf4a48d66e2b096d291dd6e2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14D87 20980 bytes

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