Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4ba049bbd2739d6f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.2 KB Created: 2020-07-09 01:32:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-04
MD5: 504738a717734ab5da3e931ff921993e SHA-1: e24bb79e3187b24bd02411016c254e1b8359ce06 SHA-256: 4ba049bbd2739d6f43c6e00cf6c0880aba431625f9a37c57f8633c4bc85c1b8c
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF document contains a mass of external links, many of which point to PDF files hosted on various domains. One prominent link, disguised as a free download, redirects to a known malicious infrastructure. This suggests the document is part of a link farm or SEO poisoning campaign designed to lure users to malicious sites or downloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=vocabulary%20worksheet%20factory%20free%20download In PDF document text
    • http://files.rcoeliohub.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131858747/ferapikudoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.coastaldeliinc.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636972/sajozazeroxuvavuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.rachellynes.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775368/c863d9adf2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.shrinkysheets.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775368/7477015.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.harmonizeyourspace.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302913/6922088.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.angeldreamsquiltshop.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695332/remipupewij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thamesvalleyquiltersguild.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740501/8517892.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.portageresourceguide.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606644/8719065.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.unidadepastoral.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437351/195585ef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://ketosofugu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tokusuwemomoraminipel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vanaligu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/96998971323.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://divosurepewa.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/42619706159.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jexoxaluk.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/pedid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xofosawe.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/lenorudebebosidara.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vovojekuvi.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/55313777512.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/13977390730.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/72707516801.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/96989945255.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/nisexabidubukov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005e7a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5E7A 5308 bytes
SHA-256: bdee5c5cf95f3a18fba9bdd1e2a4b4a417c47dea87dd9a36ea589c3f758f9cbb
font_01_sfnt_off00007086.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7086 10288 bytes
SHA-256: be40a21f58350e9bdf140c4df084ec1b04ea620f11602150a9b2518c932434fd

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