RTF malware analysis — malicious · 4b90749eb00d05cc

MALICIOUS

RTF

38.4 KB First seen: 2023-07-12

MD5: 53abacf7a56e213d22d6d7025414710c SHA-1: a193c9caf5c2d29214797bfcf91a1cc27560710d SHA-256: 4b90749eb00d05cced9d717dd1ec8f15141e20adcb2c44cfef71d587ddb98573

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution T1059.005 Service Execution

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The presence of \objupdate and a lure to 'Enable editing' indicates an attempt to trigger an exploit upon opening. The document body content is benign marketing material, suggesting the lure is a pretext for the exploit.

Heuristics 5

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00005181.bin` `aab611422be67acee705446a50e0ee71fe6a6519f02a965dbfc268612b7f8f85`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x5181	1494 bytes

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