Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4b7e70acb8904afa…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

19.5 KB Created: 1993-09-28 16:08:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word for Windows 95 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: 2ff3b0cd8b27cabec5719ba82bca5933 SHA-1: 1674c132f714c15277debc8fb180dddefcfe8923 SHA-256: 4b7e70acb8904afad419c878997d82433f26a017462dbdd736adca7fcc4de760
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The presence of a legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker (Autoopen) suggests the file is designed to execute code upon opening. The embedded Office documents with suspicious static findings, including OLE parsing errors and a FAT chain loop, further indicate malicious intent. ClamAV detection as Win.Trojan.Query-2 confirms its malicious nature.

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Query-2 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Query-2
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00001470.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x1470 14736 bytes
SHA-256: fbff7cddb1b1a2bfe8d2918d53da644bb0b3292ca7693c5d28d79bb1f0d73175
embedded_office_off00002100.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x2100 11520 bytes
SHA-256: e2ae2b1f6174c0e84104a7afbb4b67c03184dffa409a39ac00c3db6d75207f18

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