Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4b6e8f6e053dff82…

MALICIOUS

PDF

35.7 KB Created: 2020-06-04 15:21:53 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: ed7b3e53ba93d740e93b7a06ee6e6c81 SHA-1: bf7c50110e5ef58c692fbc179bd8533eed0113df SHA-256: 4b6e8f6e053dff826d9b1601beda3f0f1e43834654f6eca4badf3342e7349bd0
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a significant number of external links, many pointing to PDF files on various domains, which is indicative of a link farm. The 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' heuristic firing confirms this, suggesting the document is part of an SEO poisoning or content distribution scheme. The embedded URLs and the ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to direct users to malicious sites or to distribute further malware. No scripts were extracted, limiting the analysis of direct execution capabilities.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://mudhookbc.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739970/130739970.html#bonnie+and+clyde+broadway+bootleg
    • http://snbdojowiz.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130588396/tigog-kizasa.pdf
    • http://decorefestas.net/uploads/1/3/0/5/130544968/d13440c88f.pdf
    • http://know-agenda.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874681/mazazaki.pdf
    • http://mudhookbc.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739970/terms.html
    • http://mudhookbc.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739970/dmca.html
    • http://mudhookbc.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739970/policy.html
    • https://nimufubaleb.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/fumedikajabemek.pdf
    • https://pimikineli.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/31672303659.pdf
    • https://mipekagebiz.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/jupolaxibopowaboburijan.pdf
    • https://gegigokevane.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/disogorigiziguguv.pdf
    • https://patodulamup.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/41473634076.pdf
    • https://tamitiliredu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/fifopazusoromozawej.pdf
    • https://fakemoj.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/85756334394.pdf
    • https://sixupijemiw.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/sesekararoxepitaluto.pdf
    • https://jevogoxojad.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/11510355699.pdf
    • https://virebon.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/44634445250.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005f9c.bin
66d5e7d398bf9289a5f1e58cdd8d27776dc4780eb6758b27fe81c0d9aa9d26f0		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F9C 10516 bytes

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