Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4b5ffbfbc28599ac…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.6 KB Created: 2021-02-16 00:10:10 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-06-05
MD5: 45797989329ecb1d3e22d03a14d6b840 SHA-1: f393188131a7ccf93b89a2ad6b886f0cd4d83556 SHA-256: 4b5ffbfbc28599ac1bbd7ba7d51b23d435866473ce6df590c3e54f1e48e51963
206 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document is identified as malicious by multiple heuristics and a machine learning classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It functions as a link farm, directing users to numerous external PDFs hosted on disposable domains, likely for phishing or malware distribution. The embedded URLs and the document's structure suggest an attempt to exploit user trust by appearing as legitimate content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jottigo.ru/strik?utm_term=pride+and+prejudice+summary+chapter+39 PDF link annotation
    • https://jaxikagiwuzeno.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134698588/78dc05ce352.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guvijubeb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135318684/550f9b8e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jozinuzo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712000/633113.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kazezol.22web.org/4_pic_1_word_level_235_answer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xuvamedinomu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135392700/d5671c1a6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gefizubumob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134473977/d5e5d029451.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sekitajed.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383533/6620993.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aicberg.net/candy_crush_friends_saga_app_store56y3t.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vexepagofebove.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134866030/riluzawij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gevexivojuler.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134444242/xorigubedabetomofed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gitaligido/gi7fh1h/60356467801.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mikotefi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695671/1103654.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mipijanifubu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739658/tetelo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tizirabavapamob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453045/suwosapuzufen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://nivovagemesow.rf.gd/29914543399.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lopaxoreje.rf.gd/21764254742.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d3fd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD3FD 5780 bytes
SHA-256: 629fe210bcf27a7ea04ec8f2af14c6d185699da6303d038dd75a93948d677bf2
font_01_sfnt_off0000e786.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE786 10004 bytes
SHA-256: a95c23b891e487ac483bf65a6b7fc276ad95b8476473ac55cd413878755c0e5d

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