Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4b5f8dfdbc183af8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

129.7 KB Created: 2017-11-03 08:02:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: fd568b1abf1db5977f6b197e15a4ba7b SHA-1: 9c842e8531c106a4e7415031d75daf7722414b7b SHA-256: 4b5f8dfdbc183af809b790550888febe6b8d298ab14134b452488f7433fef4dc
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file contains an embedded OLE object, specifically an Equation Editor object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2026-21514. This object contains a payload URL that is likely used to download and execute a second-stage malicious file. ClamAV also detected this file as a phishing lure.

Heuristics 7

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object word/embeddings/oleObject3.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • ClamAV: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6362648-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6362648-0
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://betadesign.es/lbMld6sGda In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject3.bin 3072 bytes
SHA-256: 9b121b27c7686d9b639806ec0862b5c37b87f4b75d1ed7f29353424e07dee5bd
ooxml_oleobject_01.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject4.bin 2560 bytes
SHA-256: eaecb0d871d91bc4d9c135c6d54cfa4f974df2201bf7dbeb903a8eb6f23de86c
ooxml_oleobject_02.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 4608 bytes
SHA-256: 114296ad897ea0efb422bc1d395b4f62015fcb2f8f3f7100a53be3c514354df6
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe, PowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
ooxml_oleobject_02_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 2148 bytes
SHA-256: 14f9f9f3878b86eab1e0da2f3f2a096b1967efac03eb3cb411b82ed7fc26df39
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe, PowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image5.emf 5148 bytes
SHA-256: 3cc31fbd40b7d35c35598b5ce3fa1744859316e5a0ac51a435e73bddffd5c51f
emf_01.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5148 bytes
SHA-256: 11706365bf78101ef7db93d622dab580e043c21046f6b8f3d674067efc5478bc
emf_02.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5372 bytes
SHA-256: 2adff1334e5de9994accd3bd6f52d380b69fe879296a2794d251fe632855e122

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