Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · 4b59e6314be622bb

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

19.5 KB Created: 1993-09-28 15:08:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word for Windows 95 First seen: 2012-06-14

MD5: 86d8bc9b23c4bf0cf20c261b5f606a72 SHA-1: 6f6d98db1447c43e845acad0cb6131ea94e47eb6 SHA-256: 4b59e6314be622bb135fa206f994afc90d99b05b8f71c69ea852ab8f8917f74b

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic

The presence of legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro markers (AutoOpen) and critical heuristics related to embedded OLE objects with empty streams and FAT chain loops strongly suggests malicious intent. ClamAV detection as Win.Trojan.Minimal-33 further supports this. The document body content appears to be unrelated boilerplate text, likely used to obscure the malicious functionality.

Heuristics 4

ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Minimal-33 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Minimal-33
Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE

A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC

OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS

The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_office_off00002100.ole`	embedded-office	Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x2100	11520 bytes
SHA-256: `5c22913e11a55adbc6c09b6699e971b92980c2dd9ac24b95425d39c67b41f311`

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