Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4b4f18f3a68f236c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.6 KB Created: 2021-01-18 20:16:38 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: d7355ab4dda631241bf32a577b8b211b SHA-1: c623714eaaa09301252f10518526a719eb6700e3 SHA-256: 4b4f18f3a68f236c2cc503bbe48e5e458b1d1cba37f68d43961e0bfa70e5b18c
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple embedded URLs, with a critical heuristic identifying a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, suggests a lure related to recovering iPhone notes, aligning with phishing tactics. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to redirect users to a phishing or malware distribution site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/wb?keyword=recover%20notes%20iphone%20x In PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4375890/normal_5ffe1b88349d2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4445118/normal_5fb3f4404d060.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366018/normal_5f910e24bf223.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4469106/normal_5fec43fb6064c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4482617/normal_5fcf7a7aea97a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vujenibolo/io0idia/baby_grows_up_baby_alive_reviews.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1175796.mozfiles.com/files/1175796/78542262074.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1174733.mozfiles.com/files/1174733/simple_pinball_layout.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1174463.mozfiles.com/files/1174463/97996710788.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1178860.mozfiles.com/files/1178860/20186873598.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://gefetela.epizy.com/bookkeeping_tutorial.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pamakejexo.epizy.com/fowesufur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nepogewapiw.epizy.com/technic_launcher_32_bit_cracked.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zuses/miss_you_song_enrique_iglesias.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bajobakokela.epizy.com/muzogaxesajulupukoduwefex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tikofaketonub/kavaloresinujunas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jarifixe.epizy.com/80964666186.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e6ef.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE6EF 4912 bytes
SHA-256: f30d7e015c5377a7a015220628a40d8f476397f5b69fa28ccc58a2365495154a
font_01_sfnt_off0000f7b6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF7B6 11288 bytes
SHA-256: cc9ca1e3644b307ddc7f40153319cf032ad01ce54118c40d140a05d7f6e70ba1

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