PDF malware analysis — malicious · 4b41611d9a376b34

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.2 KB Created: 2020-10-20 20:47:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22

MD5: 6770d138a6bb959b4ce45380ee5dda14 SHA-1: 7cd1636d21289d255a3800a02388c682b2f95abd SHA-256: 4b41611d9a376b34928a1d8727c5275b7dfea4e83cfbe6b1d7be178567aa5029

214 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a link farm and impersonates a cloud document lure, directing users to a known malicious redirector. The embedded content, though heavily obfuscated, contains URLs that are likely part of a download chain. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the presence of multiple external links suggests an attempt to distribute further content.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK

PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM

Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE

Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE

Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://gettraff.ru/123?keyword=es+file+explorer+file+manager+apk+ios In PDF document text
- https://ridolagu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775195/4557862.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://saxibodusazo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740440/2e2107d79.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://vopevejefed.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606133/duledixefubo.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://saxibodusazo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740440/77c24ad3e119c.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ace480b4-26b6-429b-bacd-433df554d9a9/65964297501.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ad3d1e5c-01b7-4714-ae37-cc7798168833/puripirefud.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/451acc29-de7a-4e1c-a1ea-c9e287712e1f/11609806984.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/32a063c5-8423-4ab9-afea-720ad994206d/mobijunopajotox.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d6d1dd38-d62a-45d0-8339-25abc5be1f0c/sowuwod.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/susopuzupure/74047600061.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/henghuili-files/99527790168.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/felasorarabipis/67891512497.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/henghuili-files/fixonowumonufof.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/wonoti/33555567484.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/zirojopemup/87709079591.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/jamokaroxoj/99031632087.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/sugaguxagu/28197119761.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f5deb292-0f17-4e47-b054-4c6118fb4e69/zevovetidebax.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6a118aa7-09b2-4051-b31f-5c9412e0606a/vitewuvi.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d3d32e8b-05fd-4ea2-b6a2-851cd722ce98/segedipatesumiri.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/bbda1761-4de7-46b0-b126-521f95fea55d/33573446288.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ddc67cc6-700b-4186-99db-4b0fa5ca26b9/nitepeguboradanopo.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`font_00_sfnt_off00007dc6.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7DC6	3012 bytes
SHA-256: `703af8dc6e3e7fb72d120ac996c1805ad2c939f81228a9055ac86c49dd354924`
`font_01_sfnt_off0000888c.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x888C	5312 bytes
SHA-256: `73972eeda8ce0c311b05e3a7669c53e364e817c45f98ee20a08f1d1b9e8c5337`
`font_02_sfnt_off00009a91.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9A91	10528 bytes
SHA-256: `1af5fdb18f0c3e0bb74e056e35b17e80696e32be1dc0d6f224284d3cbdf81bf7`

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