Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4b341e16432fb77c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

11.0 KB
MD5: f02099299dd052f926cec45154538101 SHA-1: 06a2ea35814529c1fe9818a9f3f37d6e5dd04147 SHA-256: 4b341e16432fb77cad6dc044c4691477891d4a65e606f4256b0b20b17caf3556
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor vulnerabilities. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` strongly suggests an exploit targeting the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for initial access.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000f5c.bin
4923cce25d51a06dc0d3829003b67343bcd38691e8ec770dc166acb48814bf1e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF5C 1739 bytes