Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4b275d6144b459be…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.6 KB Created: 2020-11-12 23:41:20 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 7ab5e775cb4181f436d43746c7983b79 SHA-1: d7328a9334f1623c76e7457f8895caa2ee3997e7 SHA-256: 4b275d6144b459be39369275e0179760a8a7ea37190a4e7f312e3a4ebfd455c3
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file is identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating it's a phishing or trojan distribution attempt. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting it functions as a link farm to direct users to potentially harmful content. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, appears to be a lure related to 'tragedy theatre examples'. No scripts were extracted, but the presence of numerous external links points to a drive-by download or phishing campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/strik?utm_term=trajedi+tiyatro+%25C3%25B6rnekleri PDF link annotation
    • https://pipalilivo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310902/rizinewupigol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://folukufisika.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384255/09b3567da981.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://siwuxamafovad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134489720/8f6ad6a2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nipufijupetobug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482996/b2e508ab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tejigenunonim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813632/fawavubu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lodirunesu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874391/zimuwetegaj-ragetu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lotozuxefad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134316708/deliju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xipunozelizu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382486/nizukurajazido.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://maguduvogusimog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134583052/xalobewofivapiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://garagagu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134364865/tipakapevozit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jiwisi/la_ley_de_lenz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jeduzizonox/fiputizagowenitovimez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c301407d-47b1-4046-ac9d-5d1d0182822f/18314179357.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d260.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD260 4972 bytes
SHA-256: 55a22b5dbc6b0fb7bd0b107d58021a516c2a10507d14bc7c858e20e6ad3768c0
font_01_sfnt_off0000e328.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE328 11692 bytes
SHA-256: 9fe094d946811dc314d79603c8f83f398bc6cd0a6d2391669fc662edba2d60a8

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