Doc.Downloader.Loda — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4b172b60f17d77d8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

224.0 KB Created: 2023-05-24 00:47:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000 First seen: 2023-06-02
MD5: 6289f704ef31176ffb10651e49aaec23 SHA-1: 39d2546f846c3289cda8ed8bd4f29d6605185bd9 SHA-256: 4b172b60f17d77d8823fa4ca37a01908102b0bd8caaf181dc2279bb99a292ec4
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Doc.Downloader.Loda · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample exhibits high-severity heuristics for remote template injection and external relationships, indicating an attempt to load external content. ClamAV detection confirms this as a downloader, likely the Loda family. The embedded OLE object and EMF artifacts suggest further stages of infection, but the primary mechanism appears to be fetching a payload from the identified URLs.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Loda-7570590-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Loda-7570590-0
  • Remote template injection high OOXML_REMOTE_TEMPLATE
    Document references a remote template URL (http://###########################################WXIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIWXWIAIAIEORWEIOSFWERIOEWIROIOEWRIODSFRETRWIIIIFISDIIEIIIIIWERIIIDSF) — a common remote-template-injection vector used by Hancitor, Emotet and many phishing campaigns. Word can fetch and apply the remote template; macros in that template may execute depending on Office policy and trust state.
  • External relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels: http://###########################################WXIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIWXWIAIAIEORWEIOSFWERIOEWIROIOEWRIODSFRETRWIIIIF
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://###########################################WXIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIWXWIAIAIEORWEIOSFWERIOEWIROIOEWRIODSFRETRWIIIIFISDIIEIIIIIWERIIIDSF
    • http://###########################################WXIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIWXWIAIAIEORWEIOSFWERIOEWIROIOEWRIODSFRETRWIIIIFISDIIEIIIIIWERIIIDSF@760669521/ii/ryryryryryryyryry#############################
    • http://###########################################WXIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIWXWIAIAIEORWEIOSFWERIOEWIROIOEWRIODSFRETRWIIIIF
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
dac8f984e4e9dd647e36cb0f568bab0aa9187d55efe78bd82e2f007058c5507f		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Excel_Macro-Enabled_Worksheet4.xlsm 11677 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_01.bin
06569b42119b471f04070b4f9585a263d32198d995692e9fdded813a2a5bdf9c		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Excel_Macro-Enabled_Worksheet1.xlsm 11689 bytes
emf_00.emf
1ab8f5abd845ffd0c61a61bb09bfcf20569b80b4496bccb58c623753cf40485c		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 4056 bytes

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