Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4b0b6c420c20219a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

19.7 KB
MD5: a42c987fea11de442676ccc7e4f46270 SHA-1: 6130731f9a4129557fe5621487c88ab6537c8b37 SHA-256: 4b0b6c420c20219a94d5893b347523068a92f0f7236c007f43abe28983c5e038
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate heuristic indicates that the embedded OLE object is forced to activate, which is a common technique for exploiting this vulnerability. This exploitation likely leads to the execution of a secondary payload, although no specific download URL or execution command was directly extracted from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000013a5.bin
d00741b509a8614e9ce73622490d4df8ed1abbbf128e6154cea67190be0b94a6
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x13A5 1980 bytes