Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4b02ac4b78c52df2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

76.0 KB Created: 2021-03-11 19:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 084eaa78393d9b431e709a32bb5e6d64 SHA-1: b4306fcd6d15185ae9f0f37f9363fe858b2453d0 SHA-256: 4b02ac4b78c52df20067a51effb006597724a42bb797a68660e94c2358aa5cd3
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen macro, which is designed to execute automatically upon opening. Heuristics indicate the presence of a Shell() call and a CreateObject call within the VBA code, suggesting the macro attempts to run external commands or download and execute a payload. No specific URLs or file hashes were extracted, but the presence of these VBA execution techniques strongly points to a malicious downloader.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8b1eea1e7228c464f2f1e155bcd70b1a9c76d09b90e88d8262590030d3225a8e		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5242 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
b48806c4371ac152db7bec9c5dc365edfbff6da20a8d6eb4d6aaf69e1cb2cff4		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28160 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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