Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4aef7ab42b5c5df0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

100.7 KB Created: 2020-10-20 08:08:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 84939dd3580147081a1da00af69b3212 SHA-1: 1424054a9f5f5362caef7d23a8c313398e175bd4 SHA-256: 4aef7ab42b5c5df0d536c65ec5161a76ee4df7b66075ea875d4c3dac0b2f1f92
320 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros. The presence of an AutoOpen macro and a critical Shell() call indicates that the document is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening. ClamAV detection further confirms its malicious nature. The primary intent appears to be downloading and executing a second-stage payload, as suggested by the macro execution capabilities.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.ICEID1020-9781212-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.ICEID1020-9781212-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
68f5f09014a8f3f2bb2e4528e4ab32a31c0c39b56a4023ac3981f6d8066f7d65		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 14170 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
596a16610e1594e7ba0a7266a3351bd589a8013e94eaa8b518bed33d4483c963		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 49664 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Macro.ICEID1020-9781212-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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