Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4accce7622667413…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

67.0 KB Created: 2023-03-22 19:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000 First seen: 2023-03-24
MD5: fdc75e40621414008dbbb6c5dae7d76b SHA-1: fe2d8f24efbc4fd59c7b2b82dcb7183940b277fc SHA-256: 4accce76226674130f283d5c025a1584b7d7f1004911ddff5047776d61af1c11
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains heuristics indicating it exploits CVE-2017-0199 via an external OLE object, attempting to load content from the URL https://529f38d0-3744-4286-b484-be860d475d25.usrfiles.com/ugd/529f38_ab5ac880c56841bca4889e2e53082ddf.docx. The document body contains what appears to be financial data, suggesting a lure related to payroll or financial transactions. No scripts were extracted, but the OLE object itself is the primary mechanism for exploitation.

Heuristics 5

  • OOXML OLE2Link remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 related high CVE related CVE_2017_0199_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship points to a remote URL. This is the OOXML OLE2Link activation shape associated with CVE-2017-0199 delivery, but the local file does not expose URL Moniker bytes or a weaponized extension/content type, so the exact CVE cannot be proven statically.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • External relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/document.xml.rels: file:///E:\xlsx exploit\PayRoll-022722=031222fianl.xlsx
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • https://529f38d0-3744-4286-b484-be860d475d25.usrfiles.com/ugd/529f38_ab5ac880c56841bca4889e2e53082ddf.docx
    • https://htazova.blogspot.com/atom.xml

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
9cb9d4f9f985cc0476608798446b2a94435f24028235c3275bd86475f31c2c9d		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/---.--- 13520 bytes
emf_00.emf
5ede21369cf357b3b0419b71fb20d646d34510867588df7560cfac9731701f59		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 26996 bytes

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