Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4abe47166169157c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.5 KB Created: 2020-08-30 05:15:32 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 2060bea941958a19b84044dd4821cb9b SHA-1: 7a55a1ac5244d4006f43dcf20457b655a18ad8cf SHA-256: 4abe47166169157c4ef0bb7ffda3c4d3cb617b09a4c74614d26fd0ce19ed4804
130 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a high number of embedded links, many of which point to a link farm hosted on static.usrfiles.com. One critical heuristic identified a link to a known malicious redirector at ttraff.com, which is likely intended to deliver a payload. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic further supports the social engineering aspect of this attack.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wix?keyword=infinite+flight+simulator+mod+apk+io
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b4a829_9aba1985e82c4cddaaf3f170005796f4.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/19103d_106cad582d22495fb3372f95cf306230.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_3250571d08e34dd3aafda7f24b4ce9c5.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/39cb9d_30715c2735db451b9d3f321d8dc7fb84.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6766/0706/files/zadujetemixufakeg.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/7125/7241/files/71247078082.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_423f1dee98b64e0db23e64b60ffe3dff.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_88e5ae1a84cb4ed89e333e06beae123e.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_1f2326bf082a4b47879fbc8d03a44528.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/affb4a_21e134e9ce474bea9ddb12f5f1c4cd54.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/1956/5216/files/famopaz.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/62114329075.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/7714/7547/files/kadabadepomawuwavidogafa.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000062e3.bin
425ff5d487ba3b067d07599f29ca5d519d1f25a0ef9ad3cc060f922ca6ce58b3		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x62E3 5456 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007537.bin
51ebeec29509b87aa858d500e37ac8853184703d07d1f913ce36d8e1dc7764c0		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7537 1800 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00007dc5.bin
57ffd78cbaf97afa6eb773596cf46472c0348307ed529531c7cfe44589785353		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7DC5 10348 bytes

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