Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4aba97976344ea5f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

248.1 KB Created: 2025-10-02 05:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: e779c919063807662ef4bdae8b8722d2 SHA-1: 29a86776f8bc2bf52c57370968ef91fd130cb831 SHA-256: 4aba97976344ea5fd0662c7e6cb49027461ee201208a17b244e624cebfd1aaaa
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1071.001 Web Protocols

The document contains VBA macros that are triggered by the AutoClose event. These macros construct and execute a PowerShell command. The PowerShell command is heavily obfuscated but appears to be designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The use of WScript.Shell and CreateObject further indicates malicious intent.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b7d9ed5cdb152f5b1b06150a9e1ea8ea6fac5a69675bbe2eed8abd10bf489a81		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 8731 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
b2f975840dc1e961a6f9e63f32bc02ccc88af0bf33b8bffcbda147c96e6651fa		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 20480 bytes

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