RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 4aa853bb55b68d05

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

805.2 KB

MD5: a7c6edc0ba6c23d65a9e97bfa3d3726b SHA-1: af8f3ecf78af2744e0aa7be3dd8101d7ddacf6ce SHA-256: 4aa853bb55b68d05d40aa8215fb1ca3127ee330b1e7a4796efe3d6a89ed22d27

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to the Equation Editor. Heuristics indicate a critical vulnerability, CVE-2017-11882, which is known to be exploited for arbitrary code execution. The presence of a large, high-entropy extracted artifact further supports the exploitation of this vulnerability. No specific family could be identified, and no external IOCs were extracted.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000000cd.bin` `37a41718b5a8661fcc93e5c3070ade219d6eb689803f6f4d8713d3eee567698a`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xCD	411898 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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