Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Heuristics 8

• ClamAV: Xls.Dropper.Valyria-10030821-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Dropper.Valyria-10030821-0
• Embedded Office object carries macros critical OFFICE_EMBEDDED_MACRO_OBJECT
  This document embeds a second Office file that itself contains a VBA macro project or an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet. Hiding a macro-bearing workbook or document inside another document — frequently under an obfuscated, non-standard part name — is a macro-smuggling technique that defeats scanners which only inspect the outer document's macro storage. No benign authoring workflow stages a hidden macro project this way.
• VBA project inside OOXML medium 1 related finding OOXML_VBA
  Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
• VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
  Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
• Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
  Document contains an embedded OLE object
• Large OOXML part skipped info SCAN_INCOMPLETE
  One or more high-value OOXML parts exceeded the scanner's per-entry size cap and may not have been fully inspected.
• Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
  An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL https://www.top3petproducts.in/Diskfejle.exe In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

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