Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4a7a13ba08273794…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

226.9 KB
MD5: 4fbef7f81f171bc5845f6936a62a1284 SHA-1: 3f04850b6fc1fb9fdf41f41497ab94c84818e4f9 SHA-256: 4a7a13ba08273794791279b5fd252100f601c2477ae07b5fbceb880a96293f31
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. This suggests the document is designed to exploit OLE object activation to execute embedded content, likely a malicious payload, bypassing user security prompts. The presence of a 'Macro/content-enable lure' heuristic further supports this, indicating the document attempts to trick the user into enabling content execution.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
adf458ff71f0fe998a24b8e8ab582e93d958858149e33fa1b2366b6de1fbddb7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19476 bytes
objdata_01_off0000a844.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA844 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000bde7.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBDE7 12297 bytes